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THE ONCE AND FUTURE NINTH
AMENDMENT
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme
Court established a constitutional right of privacy) In that opinion,
Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote a concurrence arguing that the right of
privacy derives from the Ninth Amendment:2 That year, Justice Gold-
berg had Stephen Breyer as his law clerk.' Breyer's role in drafting this
opinion became an issue at his 1994 Senate Confirmation Hearings for
appointment as an associate justice to the United States Supreme
Court.'
Senator Howell Heflin, apparently interested in Breyer's views on
the Ninth Amendment and the right of abortion, asked Judge Breyer
about his clerking experience: "Supposedly . . . you wrote the first draft
of justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut. Will you
give us information pertaining to your participation in that opinion?"'
Breyer quickly cut short this line of questioning: "If you had
worked for Justice Goldberg as I did, you would be fully aware that
Justice Goldberg's drafts are Justice Goldberg's drafts. It was Justice
Goldberg who absolutely had the thought, that his clerks implemented
116
Judge Breyer had already skirted giving his views on the Ninth
Amendment during the previous day's hearings.' In response to a
question from Senator Leahy regarding the source of unenumerated
rights, Breyer explained Justice Goldberg's views rather than voice his
own opinion.' Breyer offered that the Ninth Amendment prevents the
381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
1 14. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Tony Mauro, Sins of the Justice, Sins of the Clerk?, C0NN. L. '''stirs., July 25,1994, at 18.
^Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 1999: Hearings &fore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 166
-67 (1994)
[hereinafter Breyer Hearings].
5 Id. at 200 (statement of Sen. Heflin).
H Id. (statement of Judge Breyer).
7 See id. at 166-67.
H
 See id.
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argument that the Bill of Rights represents an exclusive list of individ-
ual rights, stating:
So there was a view in the Supreme Court for a while, really
associated with Justice Black, that the only rights that were
protected against the States' infringing them were those spe-
cifically listed in the first eight amendments and the word
"liberty" in the 14th meant only those listed in the first eight,
all of them and no others. But, said Justice Goldberg, your
argument is doing just what the ninth amendment told you
not to do. So do not argue that way. And once you do not
argue that way, then you look at the word "liberty" in the 14th
amendment, and you say it is designed to protect fundamen-
tal rights.'
Breyer did not say whether he agreed with Justice Goldberg's views.'"
He did say, however, that almost every Supreme Court justice since
Griswold has accepted the existence of unenumerated fundamental
rights protected by the Constitution." Accordingly, one can pre-
sume Justice Breyer agrees with this interpretation as well.
Justice Breyer's hearings were not the first time questions arose
concerning a Supreme Court nominee's interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment.' 2
 In 1988, the Bork confirmation hearings generated
considerable scholarly debate concerning the meaning of the Ninth
Amendment.I 3 In fact, Judge Bork's answers to questions regarding his
view of the Ninth Amendment contributed to the Senate's refusal to
confirm him." Numerous articles, both prior and subsequent to the
Bork hearings, have explored the text, the Framers' intent and the
'1
	 Hearings, supra note 4, at 166 (statement of judge Breyer).
1 ° See id. (statement of Judge Breyer).
" Id. at 167 (statement of judge Breyer).
12
 See, e.g., Afternoon Session of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing: Confirmation of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice, reprinted in Fran. NEWS SERVICE, July 20, 1993 [hereinafter
Ginsburg Hearings]; Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee: Confirmation of David Sauter to the
Supreme Court, 101st Cong. 276 (1990) [hereinafter Sauter Hearings].
13 See generally, e.g., Raoul Berger, Suzanna and the Ninth Amendment, 1993 BYU L. REV. 51;
Sallfi)1111.eVi1180n, Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment; Constitutional Rhetoric and the
Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 131 (1988); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning
ty. the Ninth Amendment, 90 CoLum. L. REv. 1215 (1990); Suzanna Sherry, Commentary on the
Symposium Interpreting the Ninth Amendment: The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Con-
stitution, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1001 (1988).
"Levinson, supra note 13, at 135. According to Levinson;
Judge Bork was deprived of a seat on the Supreme Court largely because of his
refusal to acknowledge the "unenutnerated" right to privacy as being part of the set
of constitutional rights legitimately enjoyed by Americans. It is, I think, accurate to
describe judge Bork's attitude toward the ninth amendment as one of disdain.
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subsequent history of the Ninth Amendment in an attempt to deter-
mine its correct meaning.'' In no case, however, did the fruits of this
extensive research indicate the actual meaning of the Ninth Amend-
ment because as Chief Justice Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison,
"it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is." 16 In effect, therefore, the Ninth Amendment
currently means whatever the current Supreme Court says it means.'l
Although the scholars' debates over the Ninth Amendment's
meaning do not say what the law is, they do provide a background for
understanding the views of the current Justices.'" Scholars have taken
two major positions regarding the meaning of the Ninth Amendment:
the "unenumeratecl rights" view and the "limited government" view.' 9
All nine current Supreme Court justices adhere to a variant of one of
these two views. 2"
Recent decisions by the Court indicate that it has harmonized the
two main competing areas of interpretation underlying discussions of
the Ninth Amendment. 21 The Court has successfully followed both
underlying interpretations on different occasions by avoiding explicit
discussion of the Ninth Amendment. 22 Specifically, the Court has ex-
amined the reach and scope of constitutional rights in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Commerce Clause. 2' The same
general discussions in these cases lend themselves to similar conclu-
sions with regard to the Ninth Amendment. 24
This Note provides an introduction to the Ninth Amendment and
examines its future based on the views of the current Supreme Court
Justices. Part I provides a brief history of the Ninth Amendment be-
fore Griswold, focusing on the Framers' debate surrounding the inclu-
sion of a bill of rights in the Constitution. 25
 Part II examines the two
major positions taken by scholars with regard to the Ninth Amend-
15 See generally, e.g., Berger, supra note 13; Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the
Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. Rrv. 223 (1983); Levinson, supra note 13; McAffee, supra note 13;
Sherry, supra note 13.
16 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
17 See id.
15 See infra notes 122-78 and accompanying texi..
19
 See generally, e.g., supra note 13 and sources cited therein.
211 See infra notes 127-82.
21 Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (1995) (affirmative action
and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); United States v, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995)
(gun control and commerce clause); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992)
(abortion and Fourteenth Amendment).
'22 See infra notes 217-35 and accompanying text.
25 See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
2'1 See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
25 See infra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
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ment, the "unenumerated rights" and "limited government" interpre-
tations.28
 Part III presents an overview of Griswold v. Connecticut and
subsequent cases mentioning the Ninth Amendment." Part IV exam-
ines the current Supreme Court's views on the Ninth Amendment as
expressed in the cases and confirmation hearings of the various Jus-
tices. 28
 Part V explores the two potential courses that the Court might
take in the future depending upon which view of the Ninth Amend-
ment it adopts. 29
 This Note concludes, however, that the Court has
been following and will continue to follow both paths suggested by the
two competing interpretations of the Ninth Amendment without ex-
plicitly mentioning that Amendment.
I, THE FORMATION OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
On September 12, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Con-
vention rejected a motion to create a committee to draft a bill of rights
for inclusion in the Constitution." Subsequently, the omission of a bill
of rights became the centerpiece argument of the Antifederalists who
opposed ratification of the Constitution. 3 ' The Antifederalists believed
that the Constitution gave too much power to the federal government
and saw the absence of a bill of rights as an absence of restraints on
the federal government. 32
In October of 1787, shortly after the Constitutional Convention
adjourned, James Wilson, a leading Federalist, defended the Constitu-
tion and its lack of a bill of rights in a speech in the State House yard
in Philadelphia. 33
 Wilson argued that the Constitution did not need a
bill of rights because the federal government would only have those
powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution.34 Wilson insisted
that the Constitution did not grant the federal government the power
to infringe upon people's fundamental rights. 35 In The Federalist No.
84, Alexander Hamilton further argued that inclusion of a bill of rights
2" See infra notes 53-92 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 93-124 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 125-82 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 183-240 and accompanying text.
3°2 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDF.RAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 557 (Gaillard Hunt
& James Scott eds., Prometheus Books 1987).
31
 See McAffee, supra note 15, at 1227.
32 See id. at 1228.
33 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TIIE RATIFICATION OF Ttn.: CONSTITUTION 167-72
(Merrill Jensen ed., State Historical Soc. of Wis. 1976) [hereinafter 2 RATIFICATION OF THE
CoNsTrru-rioNI, (James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard, Oct. 6, 1787).
" Id. at 167-68.
55 Id. at 168.
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was not only unnecessary but dangerous. 38 In particular, Hamilton
indicated that a list of prohibitions against the federal government
would imply that only those prohibitions limited the government's
power. 37
In contrast, the Antifederalists pointed out that the Constitution
already contained a list of restraints on government action in Article
I, section 9. 58 If listing some rights retained by the people, such as
habeas corpus, would imply that no other rights existed then, the
Antifederalists argued, a bill of rights became even more necessary
because the Constitution contained just such a list." Thus, the Antifed-
eralists used the Federalists' own arguments against them to emphasize
the need for a bill of rights.'"
The first true battle over including a bill of rights in the Consti-
tution occurred in Pennsylvania in December of 1787." The State
ratified the Constitution, but a minority of the ratifying convention
filed a report demanding the addition of a bill of rights to the Consti-
tution.42 Two months later Massachusetts ratified the Constitution but
submitted a list of proposed amendments with its ratification. 43 Four
of the five states that ratified the Constitution after Massachusetts, but
before the Constitution went into effect, also submitted proposed
amendments with their ratifications."
With mounting pressure to amend the Constitution, James Madi-
son promoted a bill of rights in the First Congress of the United
States.45 Madison drafted a proposed bill of rights, including what
• 6 Tint FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
39 Id. Hamilton wrote:
I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which
they are contended fr, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but.
would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which
are 1101 granted; and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim
more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there
is no power to do? Why for instance, should it be said, that the liberty 01• press shall
not he restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?
Id.
38 See A NUMBER OF I.XITERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN, reprinted in
2 THE Conartxrii ANTIFEDF,RALIST 248-49 (Herbert J. Storing ed., University of Chi. Press 1981).
39 See id.
40 See 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 427 (Robert Whitehall,
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 30, 1787).
41 See McAffee, supra note 13, at 1235.
42 see id.
43 See id.
41 See id, at 1235 n.76.
45 See id. at 1236.
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would later form the basis for the Ninth Amendment." Madison later
gave a speech to the First Congress explaining the purpose of this
amendment. 41
 Rather than clarify the amendment's meaning, however,
this speech has generated continuing controversy." Both proponents
of the "unenumerated rights" view and proponents of the "limited
government" view claim that Madison's speech supports their posi-
tion.'"
On September 25, 1789, the United States House of Representa-
tives and Senate agreed on twelve amendments to the Constitution to
present to the states for ratification." The first two articles failed to win
the approval of the states, and thus, article 11 became the Ninth
Amendment." On December 15, 1791, the Bill of Rights became law
after the necessary three-fourths of the states ratified the ten amend-
ments.52
II. THE SCHOLARS' DEBATE
Two interpretations of the Ninth Amendment dominate the cur-
rent debate over its proper application." First, the "unenumerated
rights" view states that the Ninth Amendment protects judicially en-
forceable unenumerated rights." In other words, the Ninth Amend-
ment allows courts to enforce constitutional rights, such as the right
to privacy, which are not actually written in the Constitution. 55
46 See McAffee, .supra note 13, at 1236-37.
471 ANNALS of CONGRESS 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). In presenting his initial draft,
Madison said:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure, This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted
it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.
Id. (statement of James Madison).
45 See McAffee, supra note 13, at 1237.
49
 See Levinson, supra note 13, at 141; McAffee, supra note 13, at 1285.
5° See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, Stlpra note 47, at 916.
51 Caplan, supra note 15, at 259. One of the two articles initially rejected received the
necessary number of state ratifications in 1992, thus becoming the Twenty Seventh Amendment:
"No law, varying the compensation ter the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take
effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened." U.S. CONS -r. amend. XXVII;
With Little Fanfare, Amendment Is Signed, N.Y. TimEs, May 19, 1992, at A14.
52 See Caplan, supra note 15, at 259.
53
 See, e.g., supra note 13 and sources cited therein.
5.1 See Sherry, supra note 13, at 1001,
55
 See id
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Second, the "limited government" view states that the Ninth
Amendment clarifies that the list of enumerated rights in the first eight
amendments does not grant the federal government unenumerated
powers.° In other words, no one can use the existence of the Bill of
Rights to argue that the federal government has powers which the
Constitution does not specifically list. i 7
 For example, proponents of the
"limited government" view might contend that the Constitution does
not give the federal government the power to appoint state court
judges and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot
justify granting the federal government that power. 58
Proponents of the "unenumerated rights" view support their po-
sition with three main arguments: a historical, a contextual and a
textual argument." The historical argument, based on the Framers'
intent, claims that Federalists feared including a bill of rights in the
Constitution for two reasons. 6° First, Wilson and Hamilton expressed
the concern that a bill of rights would imply that the federal govern-
ment had powers other than those enumerated."' Second, Madison
expressed the concern that no list of rights could be comprehensive
and that listing some rights would imply that no others existed.°
According to the unenumerated rights position's historical argument,
therefore, Madison drafted the Tenth Amendment to solve the first
concern and the Ninth Amendment to solve the second concern.63
Proponents of this argument thus conclude that the Ninth Amend-
ment must protect unenumerated rights."
The second argument in support of the "unenumerated rights"
interpretation, the contextual argument, claims that the "limited gov-
ernment" argument renders the Ninth Amendment redundant be-
cause under that interpretation it would be identical to the Tenth
Amendment. 65
 The Tenth Amendment safeguards the system of enu-
merated powers by reserving to the states and the people all powers
not expressly given to the federal government."" According to the
58 See McAlTee, supra note 15, at 1307,
57 See id.
58
 See Id. One could argue that due process requires a centralized system of judicial appoint-
ments to ensure fairness. Under the limited government" view, the federal government could
not appoint state court judges, regardless or due process considerations, because the Constitution
does nut grant the federal government that power.
52 See Levinson, supra rune 13, at 140-42.
6° See id. at. 140-41.
61 See id. at 140.
62 See id, at 141.
"3 See id.
54 See Sherry, supra note 15, at 1001.
65 See Levinson, supra note 13, at 142.
88
 The Tenth Amendment states in its entirety: "The powers not delegated to the United
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contextual argument of the unenumerated rights view, one should not
read the Ninth Amendment as identical to the Tenth Amendment
because as Chief justice Marshall said, "[i] t cannot be presumed that
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect." 67
The third argument supporting the "unenumerated rights" view
of the Ninth Amendment, the textual argument, claims that the plain
meaning of the text supports the "unenumerated rights" view and
refutes any "limited government" view.° Professor Sanford Levinson, a
proponent of the "unenumerated rights" view, emphasizes the textual
argument. 69 He states that the Ninth Amendment, "with its message,
as plain as one might hope for given the vagaries of language," stands
for the proposition "that the specification of some rights was not to be
interpreted as denying the equal presence within the legal system of
other, unenumerated rights.""
The textual argument underlying the "unenumerated rights" view
further claims that the plain language of the Ninth Amendment fore-
closes the "limited government" view. 71 The Tenth Amendment refers
to powers, while the Ninth refers to rights. 72 The Constitution does not
assign the federal government power in certain areas even if legislation
would not otherwise violate people's individual rights. 75 The Constitu-
tion does, however, grant power to the federal government in cer-
tain areas where legislation might violate individual rights. 74 Thus, the
Tenth Amendment limits the federal government's power but does not
protect individual rights. 75 By contrast, under this textual argument,
the Ninth Amendment protects the rights of the people by limiting the
means that the federal government can choose to achieve enumerated
powers." This textual difference, therefore, signifies to the "unenumer-
ated rights" adherents that the Ninth Amendment limits the govern-
ment in a substantially different way than the Tenth Amendment."
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
67 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
68 See Levinson, supra note 13, at 141.
151 Id.
7" Id.
71 See irt at 142.
72 See id.
73 See Levinson, supra note 13, at 142.
7'1 See id.
75 See id,
7" See id.
77 See id. at 142-43.
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Proponents of the "limited government" view also support their
position with historical, contextual and textual arguments. 78 The his-
torical "limited government" argument states that the key to discover-
ing the meaning of the Ninth Amendment lies in the debate over the
inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution. 79 According to the
"limited government" view, Federalists feared including a bill of rights
in the Constitution for only one reason!'° Wilson, Hamilton and Madi-
son all expressed concern that the inclusion of a bill of rights would
imply that the federal government had powers beyond those enumer-
ated in the Constitution.'" According to the "limited government"
proponents, Madison's speech explaining the purpose of the Ninth
Amendment does not refer to affirmative unenumerated rights, but
rather raises the concern that enumerating exceptions to federal
power would imply that powers not denied by the bill of rights would
be "assigned into the hands of the General Government." 82 "Limited
government" proponents argue that Madison proposed the Ninth
Amendment as a remedy to this concern.83
The second argument in support of the "limited government" in-
terpretation, the contextual argument, claims that the "limited govern-
ment" interpretation does not render the Ninth Amendment superflu-
ous because the "limited government" view does distinguish between
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 84 According to this interpretation,
the Tenth Amendment clarified that the federal government was one
of enumerated powers."' The Framers designed the Constitution as a
limited grant of power to the federal government. 8' Before inclusion
of the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution did not explicitly state the
limited nature of its grant of power; however, Article I had hinted at
this design.87
 According to proponents of the "limited government"
view, the Ninth Amendment clarified that the Bill of Rights in no way
altered the federal system of enumerated powers. 88
 Thus, proponents
" See generally McAffee, supra note 13.
7'1 See id. at 1237.
811 See id, at 1250, 1259-60, 1285.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 1285; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's speech on
Ninth Amendment).
83 See McAffee, supra note 13, at 1283-85.
84 See id. at 1306-07.
85 See id. at 1307.
"6 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
87 See Article 1, Section 1, which states in pertinent part: "All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States 	 " U.S. GOWN'. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
H 8 See McAffee, supra note 13, at 1307.
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of the "limited government" view contend that the Tenth Amendment
remedied the threat posed by the lack of an express constitutional
provision stating that the federal government could exercise only enu-
merated powers while the Ninth Amendment remedied the threat
posed by a bill of rights."
The third argument supporting the "limited government" view of
the Ninth Amendment, the textual argument, claims that the Ninth
Amendment limits the federal government to its enumerated powers
despite the fact that it refers to "rights" and the "people." 9° According
to the "limited government" view, the Framers used the terms "powers"
and "rights" almost interchangeably: "Federalists referred to the 'rights
of the people' as 'powers reserved'. . . [and Antifederalists argued
that] rights not expressly reserved were implicitly granted as govern-
ment powers. . . . "91
 Because of the way in which the Framers used
language, therefore, some commentators conclude that the text of the
Ninth Amendment does not foreclose the "limited government" inter-
pretation.92
III. THE NINTH AMENDMENT'S REBIRTH
From the time of its ratification until 1965, the Supreme Court
only dealt with the Ninth Amendment seven times." On none of those
occasions did the Court explicitly present its construction of the
Amendment." For example, in 1833, in Lessee of Livingston v. Moore,
the United States Supreme Court held valid a lien placed on a parcel
of land by Pennsylvania." The Court dismissed the petitioner's Ninth
Amendment claim, stating that the Ninth Amendment did not apply
to the states.96
89 See id.
" See id. at 1246.
91 Id. at 1247.
92 See id.
93
 See Caplan, supra note 15, at 224 n.5. According to Caplan: '[djuring this first period there
were only the most glancing judicial and scholarly references to the ninth amendment, with no
explicit construction of the amendment by the Supreme Court in the seven cases that represent
the sum total of the Court's pronouncements on the amendment prior to 1965." Id.; see Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA,
306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 511 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring); Lessee of Livingston v.
Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pct.) 469, 551-52 (1833).
94
 See Caplan, supra note 15, at 224 n.5.
95 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 552.
96 Id. at 551-52.
December 1996]	 NINTH AMENDMENT	 189
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme
Court held a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives unconstitu-
tional because it violated the right to privacy." A jury convicted the
appellants of aiding married couples in using contraceptives." The
Court held that because of the nature of the laws in question, the
appellants had standing to raise the constitutional rights of married
couples." In reaching its decision, the Griswold Court recognized a
constitutional right of marital privacy and invalidated the statute as a
violation of that right.'"
The plaintiff, Griswold, was the Executive Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticutm The other appellant, Buxon,
served as Medical Director for Planned Parenthood at its Center in
New Haven. 102 They gave information, instruction and medical advice
to married persons and prescribed contraceptives to such couples. 10"
Authorities arrested appellants on November 10, 1961, for violating
sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut,
which prohibited assisting others in the use of birth control.'" The
appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.' 05
Writing for the majority, justice Douglas held that the Connecticut
law violated the United States Constitution.'" He reasoned that specific
provisions in the Bill of Rights have penumbras that give them sub-
stance.'" According to the Court, some of these provisions, including
sections of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,
create zones of privacy.'"" The Court reasoned that one of these zones
of privacy protects the marital relationship.'" The Griswold Court con-
97 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
Is See id. at 480.
"" Id. at 481.
'"" Id. at 485.
191 See id. at 480.
192 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
"See id.
I " See id. The Connecticut statute provided: Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes,
hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were
the principal offender." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (1958). The principal offense in this case
was § 53-32, which provided:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument [Or the purpose of
preventing conception shall he fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned,
Id. § 53-32.
" See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
1116 M. at 485.
1 "7 1d. at 484.
I 06 id.
1 "" Id, at 485-80.
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chided that the Connecticut law violated this zone of privacy by pre-
venting married couples from using birth control and was therefore
unconstitutional. 116
In his concurrence, Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice War-
ren and Justice Brennan, emphasized the relevance of the Ninth
Amendment to the Court's recognition of a right of marital privacy."'
Justice Goldberg argued that the language and history of the Ninth
Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that
enforceable fundamental rights existed beyond those listed in the first
eight amendments."' According to Goldberg, the Framers intended
the Ninth Amendment to quiet fears that a list of specifically enumer-
ated rights could not cover all essential rights and that the specific
mention of certain rights would deny the protection of others.' 18
Justice Goldberg claimed that the Ninth Amendment does not
constitute an independent source of rights. 114
 According to Justice
Goldberg, the Ninth Amendment lends strong support to the argu-
ment that the word liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
includes more than just those rights listed in the first eight amend-
men ts." 5
 Applying this reading of the Ninth Amendment to the case
at hand, Goldberg argued that to hold that a state may violate a basic
and fundamental right such as the right of marital privacy because the
first eight amendments to the Constitution do not include that right
would ignore and violate the Ninth Amendment." 6
In a dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, argued that
Justice Goldberg's interpretation of the Ninth Amendment "turn [s]
somersaults with history.""" Justice Stewart argued that the Ninth
Amendment clarified that the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that
the federal government wielded only enumerated powers." 8
 Justice
Stewart claimed that "the idea that a federal court could ever use the
Ninth Amendment to annul a law passed by the elected representatives
of the people of the State of Connecticut would have caused James
Madison no little wonder."
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
I 11 Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring),
112 Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
115 Id. at 488-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
114 1d. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
115 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
116 Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
" 7 /d. at 529 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
118 1d. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Ironically, after Griswold, Justice Douglas, not Justice Goldberg,
became the leading proponent on the Court for the use of the Ninth
Amendment. 12° In 1971, in Palmer v. Thompson, Douglas argued in
dissent that the Ninth Amendment forbade the closing of municipal
pools to avoid integration even if the closure affected all racial groups
equally.' 21 In 1973, in Doe v. Bolton, Douglas argued, in a concurrence
striking down abortion regulations, that the Ninth Amendment al-
lowed no exceptions to the right of privacy.' 22 Finally, in 1974, in Lubin
v. Panish, Douglas argued in a concurrence that the right to vote in
state election stems from the Ninth Amendment.m Since Justice
Douglas retired, however, the Ninth Amendment has received dimin-
ished attention from the Court. 124
IV. THE NINTH ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT NINE
None of the current United States Supreme Court Justices served
on the Court at the time of the Griswold decision.' 25 Accordingly, one
must ascertain their views on the Ninth Amendment from subsequent
Court decisions or from statements made at their confirmation hear-
ings. At the outset, one should note that the Justices do not remain
bound by the statements made at their confirmation hearings, and
arguably, they are also not bound by their statements in prior cases.
Their positions, therefore, may change in future opinions. Neverthe-
less, based on an examination of past cases and confirmation hearings,
one can discern that all the members of the Court have stated opinions
concerning the Ninth Amendment. 12"
All nine current Justices have discussed the Ninth Amendment in
a way that conforms to either the "unenutnerated rights" or "limited
government" view.' 27 Four Justices—Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy and
12(1 See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217, 233-34, 237-39 (1971) (Douglas, J„ dissenting).
121 Palmer, 403 U.S. at 233-34, 237-39 (Douglas, J„ dissenting),
122 See Bolton, 410 U.S. at 210-11 (Douglas, J., concurring).
123 Lubin, 415 U.S. at 721 n.* (Douglas, J., concurring).
124 Since 1975, the Court has only mentioned the Ninth Amendment substantively on four
occasions: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466
U.S. 727, 737 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980) (plurality); id. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965).
126 See infra notes 131 -79 and accompanying text.
127 See infra notes 131-79 and accompanying text.
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Breyer—apparently adhere to the "unenumerated rights" view. 128 Two
Justices—Souter and Ginsburg—appear to accept both views.' 29 Three
Justices—Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas—apparently adhere to the
"limited government" view.' 30
The most senior adherent to the "unenumerated rights" view,
Justice Stevens, has the most extensive record of opinions concerning
his views on the Ninth Amendment. In 1984, in Massachusetts a Upton,
Justice Stevens authored an opinion concurring in the Court's judg-
ment.' 31
 The majority held that the Massachusetts police had sufficient
probable cause to obtain a search warrant.'" Justice Stevens argued
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court disparaged the rights
of the people of Massachusetts by judging the probable cause require-
ment under the federal standard rather than the state standard, which
might have afforded the defendant more expansive rights.'" Justice
Stevens stated:
In my view, the court below . . . permitted the enumeration
of certain rights in the Fourth Amendment to disparage the
rights retained by the people of Massachusetts under Art. 14
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. ... Whatever pro-
tections Art. 14 does confer are surely disparaged when the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refuses to adjudicate
their very existence because of the enumeration of certain
rights in the Constitution of the United States.' 34
Stevens argued that the court below ignored the Ninth Amend-
ment which the Framers had written to prevent the government
from claiming "powers not granted in derogation of the people's
rights."' 35
This quoted phrase, as well as Steven's argument that the lower
court violated the Ninth Amendment, could coincide with either view
of the Ninth Amendment. It could coincide with the "limited govern-
ment" view as expressed by Professor Russell Caplan.' 36 Caplan argued
that the Ninth Amendment does not justify the creation of unenumer-
125
 See infra notes 132-60 and accompanying text.
129
 See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
15(1 See infra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
531 466 U.S. 727,735-39 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
152 Id. at 734.
155 Id. at 737-38 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
154 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
155 Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
156 See Caplan, supra note 15, at 264.
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ated constitutional rights, but instead clarifies that neither the Consti-
tution nor the Bill of Rights abolished individual rights guaranteed by
state law.'" Although Stevens's concurrence could coincide with this
version of the "limited government" view, when viewed in light of other
opinions that Stevens joined, it becomes apparent that Stevens adheres
to the "unenumerated rights" interpretation of the Ninth Amend-
ment.""
In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Stevens joined a dissent
written by Justice Blackmun.'" In Bowers, the majority denied the
existence of a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to engage in
homosexual sodomy and refused to consider whether the challenged
statute violated any other provision of the Constitution." 0 The dissent:
disagreed with the majority's refusal to consider whether the statute
violated the Ninth Arnendment.m By joining in this dissent, Justice
Stevens clearly indicated a belief that the Ninth Amendment permits
the Court to protect unenumerated rights from state violations."'
In 1980, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Justice Stevens
joined a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Burger holding that
the First Amendment implicitly guarantees the right to attend criminal
trials. 14 ' The plurality justified recognizing this unenumerated right by
noting that the Court had previously recognized other unenumerated
fundamental rights because they were indispensable to the enjoyment
of enumerated rights."' The plurality explained that the Court had
thus resolved the concern that led Madison to author the Ninth
Amendment, i.e., that one could interpret the listing of certain rights
as excluding others."' This opinion, agreed to by Justice Stevens, co-
incided with justice Goldberg's view that the Ninth Amendment justi-
fies using other provisions of the Constitution to recognize judicially
enforceable unenumerated constitutional rights."''
Justice O'Connor, another adherent to the "unenumerated rights"
view, expressed her interpretation of the Ninth Amendment during
her confirmation hearings.''" Senator Leahy asked Judge O'Connor
"7 See id.
158 See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
139 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blacknmn, J., dissenting).
w° Id. at 196 n.8 (Blackmon,J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145 445 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
"4 Id.
145 M. at 579 n.15.
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
147
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her opinion of the Court's establishment of a right of privacy. 148justice
O'Connor indicated that she accepted the fact. 14" O'Connor went on
to say that although courts had not pinned the right of privacy to the
Ninth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment acknowledged that people
have unenumerated rights. 15" O'Connor's testimony indicated that she
believes the Ninth Amendment could be a source of unenumerated
rights but that unenumerated rights could also derive from other
constitutional provisions. 151
A third adherent to the "unenumerated rights" view, Justice Ken-
nedy made remarks during his confirmation hearings indicating his
agreement with a version of the "unenumerated rights" interpretation
of the Ninth Amendment.' 52
 Kennedy testified that the Framers of the
Ninth Amendment believed that the first eight amendments did not
constitute an exhaustive list of rights. 153 He also testified that the Court
currently treats the Ninth Amendment as a reserve clause that it. will
use if other sections in the Constitution, such as the Due Process
Clause, appear inadequate for the Court's decision.' 54
 Accordingly,
Kennedy's testimony indicated that he believes the Court can use the
Ninth Amendment to enforce unenumerated rights. 155
A fourth adherent to the "unenumerated rights" view, Justice
Breyer has not yet had an opportunity on the Court to state his view
of the Ninth Amendment. His statements at his confirmation hearings,
however, as well as his likely involvement in the Griswold opinion,
indicate that he subscribes to a version of the Ninth Amendment
supported by the "unenumerated rights" interpretation.'" At his hear-
ings, Breyer described Justice Goldberg's view of the Ninth Amend-
ment, but one could interpret his statement as voicing his agreement
with that view.'" A statement by Breyer's co-clerk, Stephen Goldstein,
States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, on the Nomination °Budge Sandra Day O'Connor
of Arizona to Serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 97th Cong. 172
(1981) [hereinafter O'Connor Hearings].
14g Id. at 171-72.
1.19 1d. at 172.
15° Id.
151 See id.
152 See Levinson, supra note 13, at 135 11.19.
1511
 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id.
lm See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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further supports the idea that Breyer agreed with Justice Goldberg's
view of the Ninth Amendment:
There weren't too many changes after Breyer did the first
draft. . He came up with what he came up with, and Gold-
berg ran with it. It was clearly Goldberg's decisions, but nei-
ther of us disagreed with it. We thought it was a good idea
and should be expouncled.' 58
Although inconclusive, no evidence contradicts the theory that
Justice Breyer accepts justice Goldberg's interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment, i.e., that the Ninth Amendment justifies the Court's
use of the liberty component of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to protect unenumerated fundamental rights. 159
A possible adherent to both views, Justice Souter remarked during
his confirmation hearings that he agrees with the "unenumerated
rights" interpretation of the Ninth Amendment. 16° He identified him-
self as a proponent of that view based upon the "somewhat obvious
and straightforward meaning of the text." 16 ' He also stated, however,
that he had no reason "to question the scholarship which has inter-
preted one intent of the Ninth Amendment as simply being the pro-
tection of, or the preservation of, the state Bills of Rights which pro-
ceeded it." 162
 justice Souter seems, therefore, to accept both views of
the Ninth Amendment without any inconsistencies. His version of the
"unenumerated rights" interpretation apparently coincides with Justice
Goldberg's. 163 When asked the source of unenumerated rights, Justice
Souter responded: "[T]he appropriate place to focus a question about
the existence of a particular unenumerated right is with reference to
the liberty clause of the Fourteenth or of the Fifth Amendment."' 61
During her confirmation hearings, another possible adherent to
both views of the Ninth Amendment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
explained that the Framers included the Ninth Amendment because
of their fear that people might understand the first eight amendments
"as not stating everything that is."' 65 This statement, while ambiguous,
1511 Mauro, supra note 3, at 18.
159 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
"Sauter Hearings, supra note 12, at 276.
161 Id. at 55.
162 Id.
163 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
164 Sauter Hearings, supra nom 12, at 276.
165 Ginthurg Hearings, supra note 12.
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seems to follow the "unenumerated rights" interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment. 166
 The quote coincides with the "unenumerated rights"
historical argument that the Framers feared that no list of rights could
be comprehensive.' 67
 Justice Ginsburg appears to follow Justice Gold-
berg's version of the "unenumerated rights" view, i.e., she identified
the sources of unenumerated rights as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the liberty component of the Fifth Amendment. ' 68 Justice
Ginsburg may also agree to a certain extent with the "limited govern-
ment" view because during her confirmation hearings she emphasized
that the Bill of Rights does not grant rights, but rather limits the
government's power.'69
 Like Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg's testi-
mony indicated that, without being inconsistent, she accepts both
interpretations of the Ninth Amendment.'"
An adherent of the "limited government" view of the Ninth
Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed his view of the
Ninth Amendment in two decisions during his tenure on the Court. 17 '
In a dissent to the majority decision in Richmond Newspapers, Justice
Rehnquist argued against the plurality's interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment: "And I most certainly do not believe that the Ninth
Amendment confers upon us any such power to review orders of state
trial judges closing trials in such situations." 17" Justice Rehnquist there-
fore disagrees with the "unenumerated rights" interpretation.'" A later
opinion joined by the current Chief Justice affirms this position. 174
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in dissent.'" The Casey Court
upheld the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion as a liberty
interest protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" The dissenters argued against the existence of such
unenumerated rights: "Why even the Ninth Amendment . . . is, despite
our contrary understanding for almost 200 years, a literally boundless
source of additional, unnamed, unhinted-at 'rights,' definable and
16  See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
' 6' Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 12.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 605 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
172 448 U.S. at 605 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
173 See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176
 Id. at 846.
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enforceable by us, through 'reasoned judgment."'k 77 These three Jus-
tices apparently find the "unenumerated rights" view of the Ninth
Amendment contemptible. 178 Because they reject the "unenumerated
rights" view, presumably they would agree with the "limited govern-
ment" view.' 7"
Thus, four Justices—Stevens, O'Connor, Breyer and Kennedy—
believe that the Ninth Amendment allows the Court to enforce unenu-
merated rights.' 8° Three justices—Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas—pre-
sumably believe that the Ninth Amendment means that the Bill of
Rights does not give the federal government unenumerated powers.' 8 '
Two Justices—Souter and Ginsburg—appear to accept both views.' 82
Accordingly, it appears that one could find a majority of the Court
accepting each interpretation of the Ninth Amendment.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The current Supreme Court has apparently harmonized the "un-
enumerated rights" and the "limited government" interpretations of
the Ninth Amendment. 18' Each interpretation of the Ninth Amend-
ment suggests a course the Court should follow; nevertheless, the
Court seems to follow both. 184 Based on the Court's recent silence
concerning the Ninth Amendment, however, it appears that the Court
has not actively chosen to follow both paths, but rather that the Court
has decided not to exclude either possibility. 185
Under the "unenumerated rights" interpretation, the Court
should expand individual liberties by recognizing unenumerated
rights.' 86 Three different variations of this interpretation suggest vari-
ous ways in which the Court could do this. 187 First, the Ninth Amend-
ment could provide an independent source for fundamental unenu-
merated rights. 188 Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Kennedy may hold
1 " Id. at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175 See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
15" See supra notes 128-59 and accompanying text.
1"1 See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
1112 See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
154 See id.
1 " See id.
"Ili See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
I 87 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
I " Compare Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1974) (Douglas, j., concurring) with
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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this view.'" In Bowers, Justice Stevens felt that the Court should have
considered whether the statute violated the Ninth Amendment itself.' 9°
In her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor said that courts had
not pinned the right of privacy to the Ninth Amendment, thus imply-
ing that courts could do so. 19 ' In his confirmation hearing, Justice
Kennedy said the Court could use the Ninth Amendment if other
constitutional provisions proved inadequate.' 92
Second, the Ninth Amendment could justify finding unenumer-
ated rights in the term "liberty" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.'" justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer may hold this view, as
statements from their confirmation hearings indicate.'"
Third, the Ninth Amendment could justify finding unenumerated
rights in any provision of the Constitution that allows for an expansive
reading.' 95
 Justice Stevens may hold this view, as his joining of the
Richmond Newspapers plurality indicates. 196
 The plurality in Richmond
Newspapers used the Ninth Amendment to justify recognizing a consti-
tutional right to a public trial under the First Arnendment.' 97
 Justice
O'Connor's testimony also implied that she holds this view. 198 She said
that courts have not pinned the right of privacy to the Ninth Amend-
ment; therefore, she believes courts have pinned it to some other
constitutional provision.' 99
The third variation of the "unenumerated rights" view seems to
function as the default position. 2°' Proponents of all three variations
agree that the Court can enforce unenumerated constitutional rights
but differ on the precise source. 20 ' Because all constitutional rights by
definition stem from a provision of the Constitution, all the Justices
189 See supra notes 128-55 and accompanying text.
15° See RoWel'S v. Hardwick, 470 U.S. 186, 201 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191
 See O'Connor Hearings, supra note 147, at 172.
192 See Levinson, supra note 13, at 135 n.19.
195 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
194
 See supra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
195
 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579 & n.15.
106 See id.; supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
107 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579 & n.15, 580.
198 See O'Connor Hearings, supra. note i47, at 172.
199
 See id.
2181
 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (right to privacy stems from penumbras of multiple
amendments); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (right to associate stems from First
Amendment); Rolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (equal protection clause read into Fifth
Amendment).
201 See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
December 1996]	 NINTH AMENDMEArf	 199
who accept the "unenumerated rights" view of the Ninth Amendment
appear willing to accept the third variation. 202
Under the "limited government" interpretation, the Court should
expand individual liberty by preventing the federal government from
exceeding its enumerated powers. 205 The Court could thus enforce the
spirit of the Ninth Amendment through expanded use of the Tenth
Amendment. 204 The Court would only need to invoke the Ninth
Amendment itself if the federal government claimed that the Bill of
Rights gave it the authority to exceed its enumerated powers. 205 The
Court has never decided a case on those grounds.
The paths suggested by the competing interpretations of the
Ninth Amendment could lead to polar opposite results in some cases.
For instance, a proponent of the "unenumerated rights" view could
argue that the Ninth Amendment justifies the recognition of a Fifth
Amendment due process right to good health, requiring the federal
government to establish national health insurance. A proponent of the
"limited government" view could counter that because of the Ninth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment cannot justify the creation of na-
tional health insurance because that is not an enumerated power of
the federal government.
Conflicts such as this will result if the Court considers recognizing
affirmative constitutional rights, i.e., rights that require government
action rather than prohibit it. Any proposed constitutional right that
requires the federal government to exercise an unenumerated power
will result in a direct conflict between the two interpretations of the
Ninth Amendment. 2°6 This may help explain why the Court has never
recognized an affirmative constitutional right despite the fact that it
has recognized numerous unenumerated rights. 2°7 The unenumerated
2t/2 Cf. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (right to privacy stems from penumbras of multiple amend-
ments); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460 (right to associate stems from First Amendment);
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (equal protection clause read into Fifth Amendment).
2" See supra totes 511-57 and accompanying text.
204 Compare McAffee, supra note 13, at 1307 (under "limited government" view, Ninth
Amendment acts as more specific version of Tenth Amendment) with Levinson, supra note 13,
at 142 (under "limited government" view, Ninth and Tenth Amendments are identical).
2" See McAffee, supra note 13, at 1307.
a' Cr ;.4Cf. id.; Levi nson, su/na note 13, al 141.
207 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing right to abortion); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing right to marry); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (recogniz-
ing right to privacy); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460 (recognizing right to associate); Bolling,
347 U.S. at 499 (recognizing federal equal protection).
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rights that the Court has recognized have all restricted government
action rather than requiring it. 208
Parties have asked the Court to recognize affirmative constitu-
tional rights, but the Court has gone out if its way to avoid doing so. 2°9
In 1969, in Shapiro v. Thompson, appellees asked the Supreme Court
to make wealth a suspect classification or to make welfare a fundamen-
tal right. 21 " Either decision could have led to the type of Ninth Amend-
ment clash mentioned above. The Court instead recognized a consti-
tutional right to trave1. 2 "
Even at the height of the Court's concern over wealth classifica-
tions, the Court did not hold that the government had an affirmative
constitutional duty to guarantee subsistence to those in need. 212 In
other areas, such as abortion, where the Court has held that a funda-
mental right exists, the Court has specified the lack of a right to
government action: "although government may not place obstacles in
the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not
remove those barriers not of its own creation." 213
The paths suggested by the two interpretations of the Ninth
Amendment, however, need not conflict in most cases. 214
 A proponent
of the "unenumerated rights" interpretation could consistently enforce
the Tenth Amendment and a proponent of the "limited government"
view could find unenumerated rights in the Due Process provisions or
other constitutional clauses. 215
 For instance, a justice who believes that
the right to privacy stems from the Ninth Amendment could also
believe that the federal government does not have the constitutional
authority to regulate primary or secondary schools, thus stating a
position which under the right factual circumstances follows both
paths. This view follows the "unenumerated rights" path by accepting
an unenumerated right, privacy. This view also follows the "limited
government" view by accepting that the federal government does not
have an unenumerated power, the power to regulate schools. Likewise,
" See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (government cannot outlaw all abortions); Loving, 388 U.S.
at 12 (government cannot outlaw interracial marriages); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (government
cannot outlaw contraceptives); Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (federal government cannot racially
segregate schools).
2111 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (right to travel).
210 Telephone Interview with Charles Baron, Professor, Boston College Law School (Mar. 21,
1996).
'211 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
212 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW 743 (5th ed. 1991).
213
 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
2 " See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
215 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
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a justice who believes that the federal government has consistently
exceeded the bounds of the Commerce Clause since 1937 could also
believe that the First Amendment includes the right to associate. This
view follows the "limited government" view by accepting that the fed-
eral government does not have an unenumerated power, the power to
regulate non-interstate commerce. This view also follows the "unenu-
merated rights" path by accepting an unenumerated right, association.
This harmonizing of the two views appears to be the approach a
majority of the Court has followed.'" A majority of the Court currently
believes that the Due Process Clauses protect unenumerated rights. 2 "
A majority of the current Court also believes that it can independently
enforce the Tenth Amendment. 2"
In 1995, in Adarand v. Pena, the United States Supreme Court
held that courts must subject federal race-based policies to strict scru-
tiny. 219
 The Court had previously applied strict scrutiny to state race-
based policies in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 22° The Fourteenth Amendment only limits
state behavior; thus, the text of the Constitution does not impose an
equal protection limitation on the federal government because the
Fifth Amendment lacks an equal protection clause.22 ' In 1954, however,
in Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court recognized an unenumerated right,
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment con-
tained an implicit equal protection component. 222
 The Adarand Court
implicitly used this unenumerated federal equal protection clause to
impose strict scrutiny on federal race-based programs. 223
adherents to the "unenumerated rights" view, joined Court's opinion limiting government);
Adarand Constructor's, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2108 (1995) (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and
Thomas, adherents to the "limited government' view, joined Court's opinion affirming existence
of unenumerated right).
212 See Adarand, 1 15 S. Gt. at 2108 (majority affirms existence of unenumerated right to equal
protection from federal government); Lopez, 115 S. Gt. at 1634 (majority limits government
holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (majority affirms existence of unenumerated right to choose to have
abortion).
217 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2107-08; Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
218 See Lopez, 115 S. 0. at 1634. The majority did not explicitly refer to the Tenth Amendment.
By holding that Congress lacked authority to pass a statute, however, the Court implicitly invoked
the Tenth Amendment. Id.
219 Adarand, 115 S. Gt. at 2113.
22" See City of Richmond v. Groson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
221
 The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
222
 See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
223 See Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2108, '2113.
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In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the existence of an unenumerated Due Process lib-
erty interest in a woman's choice to have an abortion.224 Planned
Parenthood challenged the constitutionality of five provisions of a
Pennsylvania statute that presented barriers to a woman's ability to
receive an abortion. 225 The Court upheld all but one provision that it
struck down as an undue burden. 22° Although the majority did not
mention the Ninth Amendment, its decision clearly comported with
Justice Goldberg's view that the Ninth Amendment justifies using the
term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause to protect unenumerated
fundamental rights.227 As noted earlier, the dissent mentioned the
Ninth Amendment, arguing that it does not create or justify the crea-
tion of unenumerated rights. 228
In 1995, in United States v. Lopez, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Gun-Free School Zone Act violated the Tenth Amend-
ment because it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power. 229 The
trial court convicted Lopez of violating a federal law prohibiting car-
rying a gun within a school zone. 23° The United States Supreme Court
held that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to enact
such a law because of the lack of a substantial relationship between the
activity involved and interstate commerce. 23 ' Although Lopez did not
involve the Ninth Amendment, it did evince the Court's willingness to
act in conformity with the "limited government" interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment by limiting the federal government to its enumer-
ated powers.232
In none of these three cases did the majority cite the Ninth
Amendment as a justification for its decision. 2" All three decisions,
however, conform to one of the suggested paths of an interpretation
of the Ninth Amendment. 234 The question remains why the Court does
not use the Ninth Amendment to bolster the justification of its deci-
sions.
224 Casey.y 505 U.S. at 846.
225 See id. at 845.
226 Id. at 879-901.
221 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
228 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
23a See id. at 1626.
231 Id.
232 See id. at 1634.
233 See generally Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
234 Compare Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 and Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 and Casey, 505 U.S. 833 with
supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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Two answers suggest themselves. First, the Court may not mention
the Ninth Amendment because the Court views it as irrelevant to the
case. Although this may be the obvious reason, it does not conflict with
a second reason suggested by Professor Caplan. 235
 Caplan has suggested
that the Court does not discuss the Ninth Amendment because it has
become so ingrained in constitutional theory as to become unneces-
sary to discuss:
The ninth amendment, therefore, has become obscure pre-
cisely because of its own success. Its actual significance taken
for granted as obvious, its role in the ratification controversy
forgotten, the amendment uniquely fulfills one of the aspira-
dons Madison held for a bill of rights. "The political truths
declared in that solemn manner," he wrote to Jefferson, "ac-
quire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free
Government, and as they become incorporated with the na-
tional sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and pas-
sion."2"
To their proponents, both interpretations of the Ninth Amendment
might appear so obvious that one need not mention the Ninth
Amendment in order to justify its use through another provision of
the Constitution.237
 This obviousness allows the Court to use the
Ninth Amendment without mentioning it, thus not committing
itself to either interpretation. This allows the Court to follow both
interpretations without controversy.
In the future, the Court will probably continue on its current path.
Based on the views of the current members, the Court will continue
to accept the existence of unenumerated rights such as the right of
privacy.238
 The Court will also prevent the federal government from
exceeding its enumerated powers. 2" Most importantly, the Court will
avoid creating a conflict between the two interpretations of the Ninth
Amendment by not recognizing positive rights and by not identifying
the Ninth Amendment. 24"
235 See Caplan, supra note 15, at 267-68.
236 Id.
237 See id.
"8 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
233 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
24° See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, the Ninth Amendment has had brief pe-
riods of fame followed by lengthy periods of obscurity. The Ninth
Amendment played a central role in the debate surrounding inclusion
of a bill of rights in the Constitution. It then went virtually unnoticed
for one hundred seventy-four years. In 1965, Justice Goldberg, with the
help of Stephen Breyer, brought the Ninth Amendment out of obscu-
rity. Over the last thirty years, the Ninth Amendment has slowly faded
back into obscurity; however, one can still feel its presence underlying
some of the most highly publicized Court decisions.
Even without citing or consciously considering it, the Ninth
Amendment plays a pivotal role in all Court decisions concerning
unenumerated rights or the scope of the federal government's power.
It justifies the existence of unenumerated rights and simultaneously
limits the scope of the federal government's power. The Ninth Amend-
ment will most likely continue to play this role without ever being cited
by a majority of the current Court.
CAMERON S. MATHESON
